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Abstract 
Uneven development and globalization are associated with problems of poverty, resource 
scarcity, competition and conflict. The solution to these problems often presented by 
donors is better national, and also global governance: the creation of a governance 
matrix, prescribing and proscribing sets of actions by particular actors. Matrix 
governance attempts to regularize social interactions to achieve poverty reduction, but 
ultimately manages, normalizes and thereby arguably reproduces it without substantively 
addressing its causes. Structurally, matrix governance represents a horizontal sharing of 
Northern countries’ sovereignty and power, which is then projected southwards to ensure 
vertical sovereignty sharing and continued resource extraction; giving sovereignty a 
global cruciform structure. This undemocratic structure of global governance, and the 
transnational contract of extroversion between corporations and state elites which 
underpins it, paradoxically, helps to produce conditions conducive to conflict and 
corruption, recreating the conditions for its own perpetuation. The paper explores these 
issues through case studies of the new geopolitical fracture zone in the Chadian-Sudanese 
borderlands, which is partly the result of competition between Western powers and China 
for oil, and Equatorial Guinea as a space of exception, deception and occlusion to 
neoliberal normalization.  
The existence of the matrix is not a clandestine attempt on the part of the Bank to 
dominate the international development arena…the matrix is open to all (James 
Wolfensohn, [former] President of the World Bank, 1999, 23 quoted in Cammack, 2002, 
36).  
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Africa at the start of the twenty-first century attracts both positive and negative interest 
from world powers. “Positive” interest in unlocking its oil and mineral wealth and 
negative interest in containing unwanted flows of globalization (HIV/refugees/drugs 
trafficking etc). However, there is a contradiction inherent in this, as natural resource-
based capital accumulation, or accumulation in the primary sector of the economy, tends 
to be conflictual, and is consequently implicated in the generation of negative flows to 
the international system (See Bond, 2006). This contradiction and the geopolitical 
imperatives of engagement and containment which stem from it have resulted in novel 
forms of governance under globalization. In particular a new form of globalized supra-
sovereignty has emerged, under the aegis of “good governance”. 
 
Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan argues that (2007, 5) “the key to Africa’s 
progress is good governance and fair rules for the global economy”. Governance is a 
contested term, with no singular definition (Stein, 2008). For the World Bank it is “the 
process and institutions through which decisions are made and authority in a country is 
exercised” (quoted in Riddell, 2007, 375). As it is used in policy circles “good 
governance” is about the regularization and institutionalization of social interactions 
along publicly articulated and broadly accepted lines to achieve desired outcomes in the 
public good. However, the fact that the push for “good governance” has been donor-led 
suggests that this a transnational, rather than a national, project, as implied in the World 
Bank definition. In this context, the extent to which donors are a distinct social force 
from developing country states becomes open to question. This, when combined with 
  3pressures for economic liberalization generated by global markets, means that 
governance is a globalized phenomenon which plays out differentially across national 
spaces, depending on pre-existing conditions. 
 
The “adverse differential incorporation” (Bush, 2007) of Africa into the global economy 
requires variegated strategies of governance. This paper seeks to explore the nature and 
contradictions of globalized governance as played out in Africa, and to assess its 
implications for human and state security through an examination of the politics of oil in 
Chad, Sudan and Equatorial Guinea. These cases give us a lens through which to view 
the ways in which different places are differentially “globally” governed. The Sudanese-
Chadian conflicts represent an important site where the contradictions of global 
accumulation and governance are enacted. In contrast to much of the extant literature, 
this paper argues that the “resource curse” and authoritarian states in Africa can be 
viewed as particular forms of globalized governance involving coordination between 
domestically-based and transnational actors.  
 
From Exclusion to Governance: Africa and the International System  
Africa’s marginalization, as part of the process of globalization, during the 1980s and 
1990s presented a challenge to the international system. Disorder and state failure in 
Somalia and Rwanda in the early 1990s, for example, dialectically generated pressures 
for both engagement (policing exclusion) and withdrawal by major Western powers.  
More recently, Western and Asian interest in African oil has increased dramatically 
(Klare and Volman, 2006: Carmody and Owusu, 2007). Attendant on this, “security 
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continent: that is how can large-scale point resources, particularly oil, be extracted with 
minimum disruption and cost: securitizing sites socially and militarily to facilitate flows.  
 
This project necessarily entails a certain amount of state strengthening, sometimes 
through the construction of new axes of governance to create a matrix form upon which 
“fragile” states can be stabilized and reconstructed. “Good” or matrix governance seeks 
to establish and coordinate networks of actors to regularize the chaotic flows and 
relations of globalization; to establish a mode of regulation for the neoliberal regime of 
accumulation in the (under)developing world.  
 
The matrix alluded to by Wolfensohn earlier is a grid for governance based on the 
development of “appropriate” regulatory institutions, legal environments and the 
adoption of “market friendly policies”. Governments in Africa are “required to adjust to 
‘economic reality’ and ‘market discipline’ in order to stimulate exports and promote 
foreign investment” (Geda and Shimeles, 2007, 319). For example, the World Bank 
drafted a template for mining laws which has been refined and adopted by dozens of 
African countries (Graham, 2007). Transparency in this instance means that domestic 
society, transnational capital and aid donors are able to see (through) the architecture and 
workings of national governance. These social forces can then pressure for revision. For 
example, Dzata and Nweke (2001, 169) argue in relation to Nigeria’s regulatory 
framework that: 
 
  5Global competition is on the rise and only the economies that take technology and run 
with it will win the race. As global competition for foreign capitals continues, each 
competing market needs to transform its accounting information systems to accommodate 
economic changes. 
 
The new structural architecture of global governance contains within it a novel blend of 
securitized foundations, panopticisim, and modified aid regime (See Gill, 2003). The 
precise point at which the resources- security-humanitarianism triangle of Western 
power, and its proxies, inserts itself varies historically and geographically. For example, 
as Somalia lacked substantial natural resources it could be tolerated by the international 
system as an “economy without state” (Little, 2005) for much of the 1990s and early 
2000s, until an Islamic movement there threatened to assert a (harsh) new order, 
prompting Ethiopian and US military intervention (Copson, 2007). The resulting clash 
between alternative visions of social order has in-turn generated further disorder and 
Africa’s worst humanitarian crisis, with up to three million people starving and the 
conflict largely precluding humanitarian relief (Samatar, 2007 and Warlords Next Door, 
2008).  
 
If governance is the way in which authority in a country is exercised, military coercion 
for “errant” social forces is one axis of this. U.S. military spending in Africa doubled 
from $296m in 1998-2001 to $597m in 2002-5 (Yi-Chong, 2008). The further 
militarization of Africa is tied to increased U.S. interest in African oil, as a result of 
supply disruptions in the Middle East, China’s rising role on the continent and the “youth 
bulge” in developing countries, which it is also argued presents the US with increased 
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Clonan, 2008).  
 
Paradoxically, this militarization of Africa is proceeding under the auspices of “peace”. 
George W. Bush noted on his tour to Africa in 2008 in relation to the new African 
Command (AFRICOM) in the Pentagon: “we’re still working on what exactly it’ll be, but 
it will be a humanitarian mission, training in peace and security, conflict resolution … 
It’s a new concept and we want to get it right” (quoted in Geldof, 2008, 22). Some 
suggest that AFRICOM was set up to ward off Chinese energy competition on the 
continent, with a US general noting that the Pentagon would feel “uneasy” if the Chinese 
had developed a similar military command structure in Africa (quoted in Dowden, 2008).  
 
The construction of (dis)order is key to continued resource extraction in Africa. While the 
U.S. State Department’s list of terrorist groups in Africa is relatively scant (Owusu, 
2007), in some cases US military intervention, as in the Sahel, between oil rich North and 
West Africa, has called them forth (See Kennan, 2007), justifying further intervention. 
Johnson (2000) defines “blowback” as unintended negative repercussions of policies for 
their instigators. However, by dialectically allowing for deeper engagement in the affairs 
of other countries, blowback can also be functional.  
 
Governance Curses: Resources and the Transnational Contract of Extraversion in 
Africa 
  7“Poor governance” is often identified by a lack of transparency and accountability. This 
opens space for corruption, followed in some idealised accounts by economic contraction 
and societal discontent, which may become violent: what Levy (2004) terms 
“neopatrimonialism’s downward spiral”. However, Söderbaum (2007) argues that 
neoliberal reform in Africa deepened corruption as the retrenchment of the state meant 
that office holders sought out other resource flows.  
 
The key to breaking the vicious circle of poor governance is often seen to be the creation 
of tax or social contracts between citizens and the state (Centre for the Future State, 
2005). However, this somewhat idealistic and voluntaristic conception runs up against the 
hard edge of existing social relations. In particular that social disarticulation is merely a 
symptom of sectoral disarticulation and natural resource-based and enclave economies 
(de Janvry, 1981: Leonard and Strauss, 2003).  
 
Governance is shaped by socio-economic structures and particularly in Africa by its 
mode of insertion into the global economy. In many resource rich countries, state elites 
can access resources from enclaves, with little accountability and consequently have little 
need to develop a tax bargain with citizens. While Clarke (2008, 539-40) argues that 
“conditions of poverty in oil domains typically owe more to Africa’s medievalism, its 
structures and place in globalisation, along with the failures of state policies, than 
corporate investment from oil players”, this neglects how investment structures Africa’s 
place in globalization. Consequently poor governance cannot be causally isolated to 
  8national spaces, as it is the dialectical interaction between site and situational 
characteristics which shapes outcomes.  
 
The neoliberal model in Africa seeks a nightwatchman state, abstracted from extant 
social relations, to oversee the orderly export, as opposed to forceful plunder, of the 
continent’s resources. “The bifurcated causal logic here is thus resource extraction + 
good governance -> poverty reduction while resource extraction + bad governance -> 
poverty exacerbation” (Pegg, 2006, 20). However “paring down the state to a corruption-
free rump that somehow provides law and order in a poor and conflict-torn economy and 
that restricts itself to providing primary education and some essential infrastructure may 
be suggesting a blueprint that both is impossible to achieve (in its law and order 
objective) and will doom the poorest countries to at best a moderate economic 
performance” (Khan 2002, 17).  
 
As George Soros (2007, xii-xiii) argues: 
 
The ownership of natural resources is an attribute of sovereignty…Foreign oil and mining 
companies need to obtain concessions to exploit natural resources. They can obtain them 
only from the rulers of the countries, but the rulers are not the principals. They are the 
agents of the people. The rulers get their rewards from the companies, not from the 
people whose interests they are supposed to safeguard. They have much greater 
incentives to remain in power than the rulers of resource-poor countries and they have 
greater financial means at their disposal. That is why resource-rich countries are less 
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for natural resources continues unabatted. 
 
Bayart (2000) refers to a “strategy of extraversion” by African state elites. Extraversion 
refers not just to the exportation of natural resource wealth, with some estimates 
suggesting in the mid-1990s that half of Angola and Mozambique’s resources left 
through extra-legal channels (Nordstrom, 2003), but also to the expatriation of profits 
from them, with 40% of Africa’s private wealth held overseas (Collier, 2007), making for 
a particularly extractive form of geographically grounded globalization. While there are 
well governed states in Africa, such as Botswana, which are integrated into the global 
economy, the inability of most African states to oversee industrial transformation is 
functional to the international economic system, as it allows the “vent for surplus” of  
resources (Myint, 1964). A World Bank employee in Zambia noted in reference to 
current economic restructuring there, facilitated by economic liberalization: “everything 
[wealth and resources] is going out” (Interview Lusaka, 2007).  
 
As point natural resources are fixed, transnational companies (TNCs) have a particular 
incentive to remain on good terms with local elites who serve as gatekeepers. “Copper 
companies go where copper is, oil companies where oil is and so on – which means that 
these corporations do not usually have relocation as an easy business strategy, which, in 
turn means they have an incentive to preserve good relations with local political elites” 
(Brown, 2005, 157). This implicit transnational contract of extraversion enables state 
elites to bargain resource sovereignty for rents; some of which can then be redistributed 
through patrimonial networks domestically to under gird consent, or at least limited 
  10social allegiance. TNCs provide the technological infrastructure for resource extraction in 
return for profit shares and state elites can siphon off a proportion of natural resource 
rents in return: territorial for technological access in a “win-win” game. While states can 
provide access to resources through their international sovereignty, enforcing domestic 
sovereignty and security can be made more difficult by this bargain.  
 
In the Nigerian case, for example, it has been argued in relation to the new Liquid Natural 
Gas strategic business unit of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company that it “may 
develop strategic alliances with Shell, Agip, and Elf that offer it the opportunity to benefit 
from their experiences and technology, while these companies have the assurance of 
continued supply” (Anyansi-Archibong and Archibong, 2001, 157). However, as poverty 
has deepened in the Niger Delta guerrilla groups have been very effective in disrupting 
supply in the region (See Watts, 2007); a case of structural begetting direct violence.  
 
The precise balance of power between different parties to the transnational contract of 
extraversion has varied over time depending on oil prices and ideological formations (see 
for example Biersteker, 1987). Recently, as a result of agency problems “full 
privatizations … have been marked by some of the worst abuses, with governments 
getting the worst deal (e.g. payments as a value of oil)” (Stiglitz, 2006, 44). In the first 
year of its contract with ExxonMobil, the government of Equatorial Guinea received only 
12% of the value of its oil (Klein, 2005). However, this proportion was sufficient to 
provide untold riches to the ruling family; prompting a Congressional investigation in the 
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2004: Wood, 2004).  
 
The transnational contract of extraversion, despite multiple renegotiations, has remained 
long-lived, particularly as it fits with the theory of comparative advantage. It is also 
unstable, however, as a result of the “resource curse”; which is of course socially 
constructed and a blessing for some.
1 Much has been written about the resource curse and 
its dimensions have been well described (See Auty, 2001; Basedau, 2005; Le Billon, 
2005; 2007). However, site characteristics (particularly resources) are often overplayed as 
causative: a kind of resource fetishism abstracted from their social constuction.  
 
Definitionally resources provide a means to an end (Basedau, 2005). In some cases the 
end is great wealth, for transnationalizing elites. While there are shocking statistics, such 
as the fact that Papua New Guineans typically receive only 5% of the value of the value 
of their lumber when it is sold in the developed world (Stiglitz, 2006), domestically based 
elites in the developing world grease the links of these extractive commodity chains in 
order to receive rewards from them. The resource curse can then be conceptualized as a 
mode of governance as domestic elites exercise authority over resources and are 
                                                 
1 Le Billon (2008, 347) draws a useful analytical distinction between 1) the resource curse, which results in economic 
underperformance and a weakening of government institutions; 2) resource conflicts, which occur when “grievances, 
conflicts, and violence associated with resource control and exploitation increase the risk of onset of larger armed 
conflicts” and 3) conflict resources, which is where resources provide “financial opportunities motivating belligerents 
and financially sustaining armed conflicts”.  
 
  12enriched, in partnership with transnational companies, but the majority are immiserised. 
This social configuration is associated with political instability and conflict.  
 
According to Ray Bush (2007: 124) 
 
A resource curse is better understood as the consequence of the way in which class and 
social forces have been shaped, and in turn shape state development policy. That policy 
has often become structured by the politics of spoils, corruption, war and ethnic conflict, 
but is not in any a priori way necessarily linked to resource endowment. 
 
Given Botswana’s experience of successful resource management, World Bank reports 
argue that there may be a governance, as opposed to a resource, curse (Weber-Fahr, 2002 
cited in Pegg, 2006).
2 Through a series of econometric regressions the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund have identified corruption as a cause of underdevelopment 
(Khan, 2002). However given that they are not of the same strategic-industrial 
significance, Botswana’s diamonds have attracted less interest from external and regional 
powers than coltan or oil in other countries. Indeed external interest and intervention is 
part of the “resource curse”. As Terry Lynn Karl (2007, 262) puts it in relation to petro-
states: 
The exceptional value of their leading commodity has meant unusually high levels of 
external intervention in shaping their affairs and capturing their resources by dominant 
states and foreign private interests. On the other hand, petro-states are even less subject to 
                                                 
2 Full references to cited articles are not given in this article and are hence omitted from the reference list.  
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efficacious, authoritative, liberal and ultimately democratic states elsewhere precisely 
because they are relieved of the burden of having to tax their own subjects (emphasis in 
original). 
 
This “curse”, when combined with the dematerialization of production in the advanced 
industrial countries in the 1990s and declining commodity prices sowed the seeds for 
conflict and disorder in parts of Africa (Chossodovsky, 1997). The response on the part 
of the global aid regime to this and other problems of “governance” was to seek out new 
sources of state accountability from above (donor conditionality) and below (civil 
society). Sometimes this is presented as sovereignty strengthening.  
 
In this new governance structure states were to seek to enforce security and societal 
consent: to normalize society. They would do this through a process of engagement with 
civil society in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), introduced by the World 
Bank in 1999, and through the increased provision of public goods. In turn states were to 
be embedded, constrained and normalized by domestic society and the society of states in 
the form of donor and peer-review coordination (Carmody, 2007).  
 
While some erstwhile critics of the international financial institutions such as Cheru 
(2006, 364) argue that “countrywide participation in PRSPs represents a paradigm shift 
from ineffective donor-led, conditionality-driven partnership to a system that puts the 
recipient country in the driving seat”, many others are less sanguine, as the addition of 
governance conditionalities arguably represents a strengthening of conditionality.  
  14 
African states, in an attempt to attract more investment and aid, also have sought to 
collaboratively matricize governance from “the side” through the African Peer Review 
Mechanism of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) (See Taylor, 
2005). NEPAD is in essence a bargain between the developed countries and Africa, 
whereby the latter agree to govern themselves better in exchange for more aid, 
investment and market access (Moss, 2007); a reflection of the structural power of capital 
and major world powers. The peer review mechanism brings a panel of “eminent people” 
who review governance and democracy conditions in the country, although the fact that 
Sudan acceded to the peer review mechanism while there was a government-sponsored 
genocide ongoing in the West of the country might cause some to doubt its standards and 
consequently impacts (Sudan Tribune, 2006).  
 
This articulation of hierarchical forms of matrix governance was to be undergirded or 
reinforced by another: market governance (Harrison, 2005). States were to adopt policies 
which were market conforming and enhancing, which would provide the policy matrix to 
allow the private sector to flourish: a “matrix state” (Martineq, 1999).  
 
The current (dis)order in Africa is structured by a variety of key social relationships. 
These social relationships are coordinated through different mechanisms: interstate, state, 
market, civil society and community. Different actors have different types and levels of 
power and interactions between them are governed by both norms and coercion. We can 
then think of this structure as a kind multidimensional social matrix, undergoing constant 
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sphere, however there are also governance relations which are discursively obscured – a 
different meaning of the matrix; a kind of parallel social reality from the publicly enacted 
“stage play” by both African elites and “external” actors (Lockwood, 2005).  
 
Cruciform Sovereignty and the Ongoing Expansion of Europe in Africa. 
The evolution of a new multilateral aid regime was disrupted by both structure (the rise 
of China) and conjuncture (September 11
th). In the wake of 9/11, “failed states” are 
increasingly seen by Western powers as “free trade zones of the underworld”, where 
terrorists can operate outside of international law and norms (Abrahamsen, 2005, 66). 
State failure, like governance, is a highly contested term but it is increasingly defined by 
reference not only to a state’s inability to ensure territorial integrity and security, but also 
by it having failed to facilitate the process of the development of their people, or “human 
security”.  
 
As Simon Dalby (2005, 415) notes “obligations and responsibility ‘over there’ is 
conveniently obscured by the assumption of absolute difference and the convenient 
fictions of sovereignty. An ontology of separation provides the basic construction of 
political spaces”. While the discourse of human security ostensibly represented a shift 
away from statist concerns, it reinscribed the state as responsible for the consolidation of 
human life within its borders and under threat of intervention should it default on this 
(Duffield and Waddell, 2004 cited in Ingram, 2007). Lack of development or security 
then becomes a justification for economic and social intervention or “trusteeship”, which 
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is expressed, by one source of agency, to develop the capacities of another”.  
 
For Stephen Krasner (2004, 85) “better domestic governance in badly governed failed, 
and occupied polities will require the transcendence of accepted rules, including the 
creation of shared sovereignty in specific areas. In some cases, decent governance will 
require some new form of trusteeship”. His argument is that (international) sovereignty 
must be abrogated in order to protect it (domestic sovereignty). This leads to a situation 
where “curiously Americans often envision themselves as the real allies of those they are 
at war with” (Barkawi, 2006, 113).  
 
For Krasner (2004, 108) “for policy purposes it would be best to refer to shared 
sovereignty as ‘partnerships’. This would more easily let policymakers engage in 
organized hypocrisy, that is, saying one thing and doing another”.
3 “Organized 
hypocrisy” is arguably evident in the US National Security Strategy where it is stated that 
“including all of the world’s poor in an expanding circle of development and opportunity- 
is a moral imperative and one of the top priorities of U.S. international policy (quoted in 
Mawdsley, 2007, 492). In this instance the ideology of cosmopolitanism can easily lead 
to justifications of the exercise of power by dominant states (Kiely, 2006). 
 
                                                 
3 The language of “partnership” has, of course, already been extensively deployed in the field of overseas 
development assistance (See Gould, 2005). 
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sovereignty, has also recently adopted the language of “quasi states” (Greeley, 2007). 
Borders in the new discourse are now explicitly to be more permeable to a wider array 
transnational social forces and actors, not just TNCs; justified by the weakness of 
domestic social formations. This reconfiguration of sovereignty is intimately tied up with 
the process of globalization and uneven development. The creation of strong European 
states and the projection of their sovereignty globally have undercut the sovereignty of 
other societies. Thus the current reconfiguration and transnationalization of sovereignty 
can be seen as being set within the on-going “expansion of Europe”. 
 
As the triadic economies of Europe, North America and East Asia have grown they have 
become more integrated through trade and investment flows. This has had a number of 
impacts. Economic globalization and growth has led “to a relentless expansion in the 
demand for raw materials, expected resource shortages, and contested resource 
ownership” (Le Billon, 2004, 4 citing Klare, 2001). In particular certain raw materials 
such as oil and coltan are necessary for industrial production in the developed countries 
so that they become issues of national security (Basedau, 2005). Michael Klare (2001, 
10) refers to the “economization of international security affairs” (original emphasis).  
 
While some have recently cast doubt on the necessity for a spatio-temporal fix under 
Post-Fordism given the increased importance on non-specific assets (Cerny, 2006), at the 
“front of the pipeline” a spatial resource fix is still required: that is that as industrial 
countries demand for natural resources outstrips what is available from their national 
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the imperative to further project Northern claims to resource sovereignty southwards, 
giving global sovereignty a cruciform structure. The average command over the human 
and natural resources of the core of the global economy by the inhabitants of Sub-
Saharan Africa is approximately sixty times less than the other way around (Arrighi et 
al., 2003, cited in Payne, 2005).  
 
There is competition between different types and visions of sovereignty. Some refer to 
the sovereignty of transnational capital in the global system, partly as a result of 
enhancement of its mobility, and hence structural power, through the use of new 
technologies which allow for greater fungibility. Others argues that sovereignty merging 
has resulted in the development of a “transnational” or “global state” (Robinsion, 2002: 
Shaw, 2005). However, Paul Cammack (2007, 1) argues that the more persuasive 
conclusion is that “national states have a changing but continuing role in the global 
capitalist system, one in which they are oriented and supported by an increasingly 
interlocked network of global institutions that do not show any tendency to evolve into a 
transnational state”. 
 
There is a merger of forms of capital and powerful state sovereignty which Hardt and 
Negri (2000) refer to as (aspatial) “empire”. This synthesis is instantiated in international 
financial institutions, such as the World Bank, in which the US is the only country to 
have veto power and in order to protect its bond rating, the Bank must push “market 
friendly” policies. The argument presented here however sees the reconfiguration of 
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particular “cruciform” geographic structure. 
 
Cruciform sovereignty is a pattern of suprasovereignty related to patterns of economic 
restructuring under globalization. Globalization has created the imperative of greater 
coordination, or global governance amongst states (See Soederberg 2006 for a 
discussion). Horizontal sovereignty sharing amongst Northern countries takes place 
through institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which treats an 
attack on one member as an attack on all, or the European Union; the world’s largest 
overseas aid donor. The core countries of the global economy share sovereignty in a 
horizontal fashion; that is that all members give up some of their sovereignty to 
participate. However, there also other forms of what we can think of as sovereignty 
pooling amongst Northern countries on how to coordinate spending of tax revenues on 
overseas assistance through “common pool” resources for example (World Bank, 2000). 
 
Cruciform sovereignty is where the collective power of Northern states is strengthened 
through horizontal sovereignty sharing or pooling, and projected southwards through 
coerced vertical “sovereignty sharing” by Southern States. This power structure found 
institutional expression in the Paris Declaration of 2005, which aimed to achieve greater 
donor coordination, thereby eliminating some inefficiencies and overlap in aid delivery 
(Hyden, 2008), but also strengthening collective donor power. This southward projection 
of Northern power is justified on the basis of poor governance and dovetails with private 
sector imperatives. According to Barnett (2005) the global “Core” should do everything it 
  20can to integrate Africa more fully into the global economy or in the words of US Vice-
President Dick Cheney “God didn’t see fit to put oil under democratic countries” and 
“you just go where the oil is” (quoted in Bruno and Valette, 2001). 
 
In the vertical model of sovereignty sharing between Global North and South, while 
developing countries give away some of their sovereignty, their collective power (Arrighi 
in Harvey, 2003) is not enhanced as donors give only aid, rather than sharing their 
sovereignty. Consequently when Northern supra-sovereignty is projected Southwards 
into the developing world it appears as a form of Kautskian “ultraimperialism” for 
Southern populations (Munck, 1984). 
 
Increased donor coordination in the form of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers is one 
form of horizontal sovereignty sharing, representing a synthesis between Ango-American 
neoliberal and corporatist European approaches to development (Carmody, 2007). At the 
top, the matrix of global governance contains both carrots (aid) and sticks (military 
intervention) merging American hard and European soft power (Nye, 2002: Kagan 2004 
cited in Brown and Alley, 2005). The base of the matrix is to be anchored through 
domestic civil society. As Brain Levy (2004, 18) puts it “the intent is to alter the 
incentives of political leaders by reshaping state institutional arrangements in ways that 
require them to increasingly respond to a broad array of civic pressures for performance 
and not simply to the elites who have benefited from the status quo”. Former President of 
the World Bank James Wolfensohn (1998, 11 quoted in Slater, 2004, 106) argued that in 
  21today’s global economy it was “the totality of change in a country that matters” (original 
emphasis).  
 
The restructuring of the multilateral aid regime can be seen as a form of “smart power”, 
combing hard and soft elements in an attempt to re-establish Western hegemony (Nye, 
2008). In the wake of September 11
th the World Bank developed a research programme 
on Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS). Previously the consensus in the aid 
industry had been one of triage: that aid should be concentrated on those countries which 
can most effectively use it. “As LICUS are characterised by poor policy environments by 
definition they will not use aid effectively” (Greeley, 2007, 28). However, “the overall 
conclusion from the literature is that for humanitarian, security and economic reasons, aid 
should be allocated to LICUS” (ibid, 44). The rationale for this is not direct poverty 
reduction per se, but related to the wider impacts on governance; “strengthening political 
stability” and “domestic leadership” and “reducing ethnic tension” and “enhancing 
security” (p. 48). While it is argued that “Country Policy Institutional Assessments” 
provide little ex ante guidance in the case of aid allocation to LICUS, outcomes can be 
judged against a “Transitional Results Matrix”. Matrix governance, backed by economic 
and military force, is in turn a reflection of a broader reconfiguration of sovereignty. We 
now turn to a case study of matrix governance and its contradictions.  
 
The Geopolitics of “Poverty Reduction” and Conflict in Africa: The Chad-
Cameroon and Sudanese Oil Pipelines 
  22In the early 1990s Robert Kaplan (1994) saw West Africa as a zone exemplifying the 
“Coming Anarchy”. Since that time however, largely as a result of international 
interventions, conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone have ended. These conflicts were 
funded by diffuse resources, particularly timber and diamonds, and facilitated by 
collapsing states. As such they were expressions of exclusion in the globalized economy. 
However, a new zone of conflict has now emerged further to the East, in Sudan and 
Chad; partly as a result of an elaborate scheme to reduce poverty. 
 
The conflict in Darfur, Sudan is often presented as being a largely local one between 
pastoralists and settled farmers over access to water and land. According to Jok (2007, 
21) “the region has been experiencing turmoil for some time due to droughts and scarcity 
of resources”, along with other factors. However, this paper argues that the conflict in 
Sudan and neighbouring Chad is multi-scalar (local, national and global) and is best 
viewed, in part, as a proxy conflict between the Western powers and China over access to 
oil. 
 
The countries of the Horn of Africa have many of the features of a Regional Security 
Complex, displaying high levels of security interdependence (Buzan and Waever, 2003 
cited in Healy, 2008). While both Chad and Sudan have had long running civil wars 
between “North” and “South”, the axes of conflict have now become transborder and 
have largely shifted to East-West
4 – a merged form of civil and shadow inter-state war, 
                                                 
4 Although the North-South conflict in Sudan reignited in 2008 around the town of Abeyi on the oil rich 
border between Northern and Southern Sudan. Southern Sudanese nationalism has been growing and is 
  23with the two states sponsoring rebel groups in the other’s territory. The weak claim to 
territorial integrity and control; juridical as opposed to empirical sovereignty, means that 
this area is now a “binational transborder space”  (Morales and Castro, 1999 cited in 
Robinson, 2003) characterised by a multitude of non-state sanctioned flows of people 
(refugees and rebels) and goods. The new conflict zone is at a fault line of geopolitical 
and economic influence where East (Chinese-backed Sudan) meets West (Western-
backed Chad). Both Sudan and Chad have recently constructed and opened oil pipelines 
oriented respectively to the East and the West and in between lies a new “geopolitical 
fracture zone” (Anderson, 1996).  
 
While the wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia were partly about the dissolution of 
patrimonial networks as a result of economic liberalization and fiscal rectitude (Reno, 
1995) and the availability of diffuse arable diamonds and timber which could be used to 
fund rebel movements; that is a tendency towards exclusion under globalization, the new 
conflict is different. Rather, the conflicts in Chad and Sudan are being largely fuelled by 
resentment over the distribution of oil rents, derived from point resources, and the 
availability of oil money to buy arms. As Nordstrom (2007) argues most African 
currencies are not internationally accepted and hence natural resources become the 
substitute hard currency to administer countries and buy arms – in other words the source 
of sovereignty.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
expressed through events such as beauty pageants where the bodies of young women serve as icons for “the 
nation” (See Faria, 2008).  
  24The conflict in Darfur is partly the result of environmental scarcity as nomads and settled 
communities dispute for scarce resources, particularly land, in the context of recent 
catastrophic droughts (Belloni, 2007). While the history of the conflict in Darfur has long 
roots, it is also, in part, the outcome of a particular form of regionalized “petro-Islamism” 
which has emerged in Sudan (Prunier, 2006). According to Butcher (2008) “the people of 
Darfur have seen numerous droughts, waves of divisive identity politics from inside and 
outside Sudan, asymmetrical militarization of the populace, undermining of local politics 
and justice courts, systematic neglect from the State, a lack of representation in the 
North-South peace talks, and no share in the economic concessions on oil revenue and 
political power”.  
 
The rebellion which began in Darfur in 2003 against the government, and later spread to 
the East of the country, was partly based on resentment of large-scale and long-term 
regional exclusion. The spark which ignited the (oil) flame was exclusion from the 
revenue sharing agreement between the “North” and the South of Sudan, which were to 
divide oil revenues between them under the outline peace agreement (Jok, 2007) to the 
exclusion of the West and East of the country. As Abdullahi Osman El-Tom (2007, 227) 
puts it “the current Darfur armed insurgency is central to grass-root struggles for a fairer 
division of national resources”.  
 
The Chad-Cameroon pipeline is Africa’s largest ever private construction project, with a 
price tag of US $3.5bn, and began operation in 2003 (the year in which the Darfur 
conflict ignited). It is based on a consortium of three oil companies (ExxonMobil, 
  25ChevronTexaco and Petronas), and the World and European Investment Banks. It was 
meant to be an example of intertemporal and multi-level governance for poverty 
reduction with elaborate mechanisms for transparency and monitoring of oil revenues 
ranging from national oversight committees and international advisory groups (See 
Calderisi, 2007 for a fuller description). However, partly because of problems associated 
with oil wealth, Sudan and Chad come out in 45
th and 46
th places respectively out of 48 
on the Mo Ibrahim Governance Index of Africa (The Economist, 2007). 
 
The energy to enable the “buzz” in industrial districts in rich countries and the knowledge 
pipelines extending out from them (Bathelt et al., 2004) are partly fuelled by oil coming 
from these areas. However, the “buzz” directly associated with these oil pipelines is the 
sound of helicopter gunships, and the deafening sound of flow stations.
5 Meanwhile the 
ExxonMobil oil facility in Chad, by itself, produces six times more electricity than the 
entire rest of the country. “In the oil-producing region, the stark contrast between the well 
lit oil facilities and the darkened neighboring towns and villages cannot fail to ignite 
passions” (International Advisory Group, 2004 quoted in Pegg, 2006, 18). This is one of 
the sites where the contradiction that the globalized economy is dependent on territorially 
fixed resource extraction grounds (Omeje, 2005).  
 
According to Francis Fukayama (2007: 179-180) 
                                                 
5 Helicopter gunships have been used in Sudan as a weapon for population displacement to areas under 
government control, thereby denying rebels civilian support and also opening up government control of 
international aid (“aid farming”) (Jok, 2007). 
  26 
The most striking recent example of shared sovereignty is the Chad-Cameroon gas (sic) 
pipeline, in which the government of Chad agreed to put expected energy revenues from 
natural gas into a trust fund to be administered by the World Bank and other international 
trustees. Chad in effect agreed with the international community that it could not be 
trusted to use its own energy revenues properly and needed external help to avoid being 
dragged into the morass of corruption and rent-seeking.  
 
While Harrison (2005) conceptualizes sovereignty as a frontier rather than a boundary, 
the World Bank intervention in Chad might more accurately be represented as 
sovereignty piercing, rather than sharing. However, the problems with this externally 
driven, one-way vertical model of “shared sovereignty”, quickly became evident (See 
Kojucharov, 2007), as a signing bonus from the oil companies was partly used by the 
government of Chad to purchase arms; the President appointed his brother-in-law to the 
oversight committee and the law governing revenue expenditure was rewritten. Indeed 
the Chadian government had previously “created forty-three phantom NGOs and activist 
groups in an effort to groom a friendly civil society representative for the committee” 
(Ghazvinian, 2007, 255). In return for the breach of agreement the World Bank, 
suspended its loans to Chad and froze the “Future Generations Fund”, which was held 
offshore (Copson, 2007).  
 
In part this renegotiation could be seen as an example of state building, as Chad redressed 
the balance of power between it and the oil companies to raise the amount of revenue it 
received from 7%, in its initial contracts, in comparison to the 90% of revenues going to 
  27“more experienced and capable petro-states” (Karl, 2007, 262). The Chadian state is 
anxious to capture increased tax revenue from the project as President Deby threatened to 
eject Petronas and Chevron if they failed to pay taxes he claimed were owed, although a 
tax holiday had previously been agreed. Prior to that the government had received less 
than fifty cents on the barrel to spend as it wished (Ghazvinian, 2007). Eventually, a new 
face-saving accommodation, which allowed for greater government discretionary 
spending, was reached between Chad and the World Bank (Frynas and Paulo, 2007).  
 
Natural resource fixity allows some bargaining power for poor peripheral states in their 
dealings with TNCs and international financial institutions, particularly in the case of oil. 
Thus the geographical fixing in space of the pipeline, the extent of sunk costs, and the 
juridical concept of territorial sovereignty enabled a renegotiation of the contract of 
extraversion to the benefit of the Chadian ruling elite, and President Deby’s princely 
sovereignty in particular. Krasner’s (2004) argument that the lesson the of the Chad-
Cameroon pipeline is that creating “potent shared sovereignty institutions” in weak states 
is difficult, indicates a need for a greater reliance on economic and monetary force. 
 
The increased spending on arms from the renegotiation did not stop rebels from Sudan 
nearly toppling Deby in early 2008. While the new French President Nicolas Sarkosy was 
supposedly opposed to the old policy of “Françafrique” (backing friendly dictators) he 
eventually did give military assistance to Deby after rebels reached the presidential 
compound and nearly overthrew him in 2008. According to the Economist (2008, 43) this 
was because “Mr. Déby’s demise would probably mean a freer hand for Sudan in eastern 
  28Chad and the ravaged Sudanese region of Darfur”. The French-led UN peace keeping 
force in Chad is ostensibly to protect refugees from neighbouring Chad but according to 
Prunier (quoted in Storey, 2008, 12) “Idriss Déby is hanging on to power by the skin of 
his teeth but he is likely to hang on only as long as Paris and Brussels continue to support 
him under some kind of pseudo-humanitarian face-saving dispensation”.  
 
According to the French general who chairs the European Union’s military committee 
and who has overseen the deployment of troops to Chad, “lettings some parts of the 
world, particularly Africa fall into a permanent cycle of violence has consequences for 
Europeans” (quoted in Smyth, 2008, 12). Thus humanitarianism is, in part, a control 
strategy to contain disorder and chaos from spilling over to the developed world (Belloni, 
2007) and is infused with geopolitical imperatives. The current “blowback”  for 
Westerners, results from the fact that, as another French general said of Europeans in 
1911, “to open markets for their trade in Africa they have stamped out the last vestiges of 
African civilization” (Meynier quoted by Dumont, 1962 in Dunkley, 2004, 72) giving 
rise in parts of Africa to a “plunder economy” (Cramer, 2006).  
 
The lure of oil revenue undoubtedly has contributed to rebel attempts to dislodge 
Presidents Deby, and Bashir in Sudan from power. Indeed some of the rebel groups in 
Chad are led by Deby’s own uncles. In this way oil has both strengthened Chad’s 
sovereignty by providing state resources and undermined it by encouraging violent 
resource competition. As the most important traded commodity in the world, oil congeals 
the contradictions of globalization as expressed in the restructuring of sovereignty.  
  29 
The Matrix Unloaded: Spaces of Exception, Deception and Occlusion.  
Giorgio Agamben (2005) has written of “spaces of exception” where politically qualified 
life becomes “bare life”, as in concentration camps for example. I am using the term here 
somewhat differently to refer to those national spaces which have fallen outside of the 
ambit of neoliberal normalization, such as China and its close allies in Africa, Sudan and 
Zimbabwe, whose governments have been guilty of egregious human rights violations. 
These have been judged to be “rogue states”, by the “international community”; in a state 
of exception to international civil and political rights norms. While the US government 
has an “Office of Transition Initiatives” in the United States Agency for International 
Development to undermine unfriendly governments such as Zimbabwe and Sudan 
(Sautman and Hairong, 2008), close US allies and major oil producers in Africa such as 
Equatorial Guinea have also been guilty of major abuses. For example, the government of 
Equatorial Guinea has executed missionaries, tourists and aid workers, while remaining 
in the words of US Secretary of State Condolezza Rice a “good friend” of the United 
States (Soares de Oliveira, 2007). Rather than freezing the $700 million the Obiang 
family had put in US bank accounts, given its geostrategic interests in the country the 
Bush administration returned the money to them (Muna, 2008).  
 
Equatorial Guinea has one of the highest per capita incomes in the world, but still 
performs very poorly on the UN’s Human Development Index. This has led to paradoxes 
such as self-funding of aid, whereby the Equato-Guinean government gives money to the 
United States Agency for International Development to spend on health and education 
  30programs in the country (Copson, 2007). The fact that it receives almost no media 
attention in the West is in part because of its U.S. “ally” status; making it a space of 
occlusion and deception in Western public discourse.  
 
In Equatorial Guinea the government party recently won 99 out of 100 seats in the 
legislature. Either this is an indication of extraordinary popularity or something else. 
Even though the US Department of State (2004 cited in Jordaan, 2007) condemns allies 
“seriously marred” elections, in the Rwandan case for example, this does not stop 
Presidential visits and military cooperation. In fact this should not be surprising as US 
President George W. Bush has stated that disinformation is a legitimate weapon in the 
“war on terror” (See Kennan, 2007). The unveiling of Muslim regimes crimes, and the 
tolerance for the abuses of allies further undermines the plausibility of a global rights-
based governance regime.  
 
Conclusion: Matrix Governance, the Poverty Regime and the Rise of China in 
Africa.  
Matrix governance in resource rich states attempts to rectify the “ungovernability” 
(Watts, 2007) generated by resource extraction. It seeks to regularize the chaotic flows 
and relations of globalization and allow for transparency in the allocation of domestically 
produced social surplus (plus aid) captured by the government for social investment, 
while also allowing for the outflow of resources and the rents which accompany it.  
However, this project is contradictory if we see poverty as a relational, rather than an 
absolute phenomenon. By opening up states to global market competition, a particular 
  31kind of bioeconomics is enacted, whereby everyone is to be connected to the webs of the 
global labor and commodity markets; a kind of ubuntu in reverse, not based on solidarity, 
but on upwards flows of social surplus. Then matrix governance can be seen as an effort 
to control the problems produced by poverty; to create a global poverty regime, where it 
is managed rather than eliminated (Nicholls, 2003). However, there are sources of 
potential challenge to this governance structure. 
 
The uneven development of the global capitalist economy throws up new power centers, 
particularly China, which seek both to influence the shape of the global governance 
matrix, and in geographically specific cases to support exceptions to it in the name of 
realpolitik. The rise of China and increasing South-South globalization could potentially 
undermine the cruciform structure of global sovereignty, by bolstering the principle of 
non-interference in internal affairs (Taylor, 2004). China’s involvement in Africa is 
giving greater autonomy to incumbent rulers to engage in “balancing” between major 
power. Deby in Chad recognized China in 2006 and has been fêted in Bejing, with 
Chadian flags flown on Tianammen Square during his visit (Taylor, 2009). China’s rise 
also potentially challenges the other basis of orthodox global governance: the rule of the 
market over the individual and household.  
 
According to Ramo (2004, 11-12 cited in Payne, 2005, 98), for example, the “Beijing 
Consensus” “rejects the theory of comparative advantage in favor of a focus on 
developing countries adopting leading-edge technologies to “create change that moves 
faster than the problems that change creates.” This economic-philosophical “war of 
  32position” challenge to neoliberal hegemony could lay the groundwork for China’s 
eventual supersession of the United States as the world’s dominant superpower, as its 
activist, empowered and anti-democratic state is attractive to many incumbent developing 
world political elites. However, while China is in geo-economic competition with 
Western powers in Africa, its companies often sign joint ventures with them and the 
extent to which Western and Chinese capital are empirically distinct social forces is 
consequently somewhat open to question. China also has interests in resource extraction, 
so the overall parameters of “governance” in ensuring this continues.  
 
According to Bahgat (2007, 1) “competition between Washington, Beijing and Brussels 
over Africa’s energy resources should not be seen in zero-sum terms. The underlying and 
inescapable fact is that the development of the continent’s oil resources would contribute 
to overall stability in global oil markets – a shared goal by both consumers and 
producers”. While there is competition over specific resources in specific places, both 
China and the West have a shared common and general interest in the continued 
exportation of Africa’s resources. Even in Sudan, European companies are involved in 
the construction of the largest Chinese-financed construction project in Africa: the 
Merowe Dam which will double Sudan’s power supply and thereby facilitate continued 
energy exports (Jok, 2007: Sautman and Hairong, 2008). The Chinese government has 
also announced that it will cooperate with the World Bank (China Daily, 2006) for 
example and there is a new US-China-Africa Trilateral Dialogue. Indeed the new chief 
economist at the World Bank is Chinese. Thus China is in the process of being absorbed 
into the global core. As Ayittey (2005, 422) notes “if Africans give their problems to a 
  33foreigner to solve he will do so to his advantage” (emphasis in original); generating 
incentives for coordination amongst the major powers: a further iteration of the 
transnational contract of extraversion.  
 
According to Arrighi (2007, 389) the social and ecological contradictions of China’s own 
growth have led to a major reorientation towards greater sustainability and social equity 
and if this is projected internationally “China will be in a position to contribute decisively 
to the emergence of a commonwealth of civilizations truly respectful of cultural 
differences”. However, as China becomes the world’s largest economy, the on-going 
need for a resource fix will negate this possibility. The expansion of the core of the global 
economy will necessitate on-going resource colonialism and the further revision and 
enactment of global governance. Consequently cruciform sovereignty and matrix 
governance are likely to remain long-lived, despite the shifting centre of gravity of the 
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